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Introduction: Speaking Up for Justice, Suffering
Injustice: Whistleblower Protection and the Need
for Reform
Dana L. Gold
The Pentagon Papers.1 Enron.2 Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.3 Pink slime in



Dana L. Gold is a Senior Fellow at the Government Accountability Project (GAP), the
nation’s leading whistleblower protection organization since 1977. She serves as an
employee advocacy member of the Hanford Concerns Council. Ms. Gold is also the
board chair of Hanford Challenge, a public interest organization focused on promoting
safe and effective cleanup at the Hanford site by working with whistleblowers. Ms. Gold
earned her BA from the College of William and Mary and her JD, cum laude, from
Seattle University School of Law.
1
In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg, one of the most legendary whistleblowers in US history,
leaked internal documents known as the “Pentagon Papers,” evidencing the Nixon
administration’s misrepresentations about the progress of the Vietnam War. See Mark
Jenkins, Ellsberg’s ‘Dangerous’ Decision: To Tell the Truth, NPR (Feb. 4, 2010, 7:30
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123370933&ps=rs. They
were leaked to Congress and eventually to The New York Times. Id.
2
The fall of the Enron corporation in late 2001 was, at the time, the largest bankruptcy
in US history, followed by WorldCom in 2002 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. Shira
Ovide, MF Global: Likely Among the 10 Biggest Bankruptcies Ever, WALL ST. J. DEAL J.
(Oct. 31, 2011, 10:58 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/31/mf-global-likelyamong-the-10-biggest-bankruptcies-ever/?mod=e2tw. Sherron Watkins, then a Vice
President at Enron, alerted Enron CEO Ken Lay that, after learning of accounting
irregularities, the company “might implode in a wave of accounting scandals.” Sherron
Watkins, Sherron’s Bio, SHERRONWATKINS.COM, http://www.sherronwatkins.com/
sherronwatkins/Sherrons_Bio.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). Watkins’s warnings were
correct; she testified about her whistleblowing and what she discovered before
Congressional committees investigating the disaster and ultimately received numerous
honors for her demonstration of workplace ethics. Id.
3
Harry Markopolis, an independent fraud investigator, alerted the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on five separate occasions between 2000 and 2008 about
the largest financial fraud in history, perpetrated by Bernard Madoff. The Man Who
Figured Out Madoff’s Scheme, CBSNEWS (June 14, 2009, 8:45 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-4833667.html. The SEC refused to
investigate Mr. Madoff despite the overwhelming evidence that Markopolis offered
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ground beef.4 Widespread home loan fraud.5 Safety issues at the Hanford
Nuclear site, the most contaminated site in North America.6 Some of the
most significant issues of social, environmental, and economic injustice
have been brought to light and, subsequently, addressed, mitigated, or
prevented because of whistleblowers.
Whistleblowers can generally be defined as employees who disclose a
concern that evidences a reasonable belief of illegality, waste, fraud,
pointing to an elaborate Ponzi scheme, which ultimately resulted in more than $50 billion
lost from investors’ accounts. Id.
4
Kit Foshee, former director of food safety for BPI, the company that sold more than 70
percent of the ground beef consumed in the United States, blew the whistle on the
company’s false claims that the ammonia-treated beef, popularly referred to as “pink
slime,” created a safer, more nutritious product. Where You Can Get ‘Pink Slime’-Free
Beef, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2012, 8:19 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/headlines/2012/03/where-you-can-get-pink-slime-free-beef; 70 Percent of Ground
Beef at Supermarkets Contains ‘Pink Slime,’ ABC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012, 7:52 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/03/70-percent-of-ground-beef-atsupermarkets-contains-pink-slime/ (reporting that USDA whistleblower knows 70
percent of ground beef sold contains pink slime). Hundreds of schools, grocery chains
and fast-food restaurants announced in 2012 that they would discontinue using or selling
BPI’s “pink slime” products. McDonald’s Announces End to ‘Pink Slime’ in Burgers,
ABC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2012, 3:26 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2012/02/01/
mcdonalds-announces-end-to-pink-slime-in-burgers/; The Beef with “Pink Slime”
Continues as Supermarkets, Schools Drop Byproduct, CBS NEWS (Mar. 22, 2012, 2:02
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-57402492-10391704/the-beef-withpink-slime-continues-as-supermarkets-schools-drop-byproduct/.
5
Whistleblowers Eileen Foster, former executive vice president of Fraud Risk
Management at Countrywide and Bank of America, and Richard Bowen, former vice
president of Citigroup, both blew the whistle internally on widespread home mortgage
defects and fraud that were the ultimate causes of the 2008 financial meltdown. 60
Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street, (CBS television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57336042/prosecuting-wall-street/.
6
Walter Tamosaitis, a supervising engineer at Hanford’s Waste Treatment Plant, was
reassigned after raising concerns about design defects of the plant that could contribute to
system malfunctions that could cause nuclear reactions. Peter Eisler, Problems Plague
Cleanup at Hanford Nuclear Waste Site, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2012, 11:36 AM,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/environment/story/2012-01-25/hanford-nuclearplutonium-cleanup/52622796/1. His concerns have been validated by the Department of
Energy and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and other whistleblowers have
begun to come forward with additional concerns about safety problems with the plant. Id.
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mismanagement, an abuse of power, or a substantial and specific danger to
health, safety, or the environment.7 A whistleblower might disclose this
internally—for example, to their supervisors or through an employee
concerns program—or externally—for example, to a legislator, an
enforcement agency, a watchdog organization, or a journalist.8
7
Many federal laws contain whistleblower protection provisions that protect employees
from retaliation if they provide information about a violation, file a complaint, or testify
in a proceeding resulting from enforcement of the overarching law. See, e.g., Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1977); Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105
(2007); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2087 (2008). More than
twenty laws regulating workplace safety, airlines, environmental standards, financial
reform, nuclear operations, food safety, and more are enforced by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). See, Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes_page.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2013). Other whistleblower laws cover specific types of workers, such as federal
employees, and outline the kinds of activities that are protected. See, e.g., Whistleblower
Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). The Act protects:

[D]isclosure of information by an employee which the employee or applicant
reasonably believes evidences (i) a violation of any law, rule or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such disclosure is
not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or the conduct of foreign affairs.
Id.
8

As I will explain in this article, whistleblower protection law is made up of a
patchwork of legal protections that are found in nearly sixty federal statutes (not to
mention state statutes and common law). See TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI,
THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 247–50 (2011). Some laws
protect many types of disclosures, both to internal management as well as to outside
enforcement agencies and to the press. See, e.g., Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. §
5851(a)(1) (2005); see also In Re Joe Gutierrez, ARB Case No. 99-116, 2002 WL
31662915 (Dep’t of Labor. Nov. 13, 2002) (final admin. Review) (holding that raising
health and safety concerns about issues at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in internal
reports, to Department of Energy officials, the newspaper, members of Congress, and a
citizen group were all considered protected activity under the ERA). Other laws
specifically define to whom a whistleblower can make disclosures to receive protection
from retaliation. See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2409
(2008) (“[A] Member of Congress, a representative of a committee of Congress, an
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Whistleblowers promote corporate and government accountability by being
the first line of defense against wrongdoing, and, as such, are one of the
most effective and powerful tools for protecting the public interest.
Unfortunately, employees who raise serious concerns about institutional
wrongdoing do not typically receive bonuses, promotions, or other
expressions of gratitude for bringing issues to light. Instead, whistleblowers
disclose issues at great risk to their professional and personal lives.
Frequently, and predictably, employers respond to employees who identify
problems with various forms of retaliation; for example, whistleblowers can
face overt hostility, accusations of poor performance and being a poor
“team player,” stripping of responsibility, and transfer to undesirable office
locations (and, thus, denial of access to more information about
wrongdoing), harassment by or isolation from coworkers, and even
termination. The whistleblower is treated as the problem instead of the
wrongdoing that he or she has reported.9
A legitimate fear of retaliation is one of the leading reasons employees
stay silent, coupled with a belief that nothing will be done to address the
problems that they identify.10 Add to these barriers the complex societal
perceptions of whistleblowers: we look down on “snitches,” “squealers,”
“troublemakers,” and “tattletales,” but we condemn just as strongly those

Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office, a Department of Defense
employee responsible for contract oversight or management, or an authorized official of
an agency or the Department of Justice.”).
9
DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 8, at 16; ETHICS RES. CTR., RETALIATION:
WHEN WHISTLEBLOWERS BECOME VICTIMS: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011
NATIONAL
BUSINESS
ETHICS
SURVEY
18–23
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/RetaliationFinal.pdf [hereinafter ERC RETALIATION
REPORT].
10
ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER: A SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 4 (2012), available at
http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/reportingFinal.pdf.
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who “don’t want to get involved” or who “look the other way.”11 We
simultaneously believe in the right to privacy and the public’s right to
know. Whistleblowers are painted as disloyal and self-interested, and are
also lauded as courageous, everyday heroes. The pressures to stay silent are
real, as are the risks of speaking up—for every Sherron Watkins, Colleen
Rowley, and Cynthia Cooper heralded as Time Magazine’s Persons of the
Year in 2002,12 hundreds of other employees receive no public validation or
support for their contribution to justice, and, instead, suffer professional,
financial, psychological, and personal trauma that affects them and their
families and from which it can take years to recover.13
Despite the undeniably important role that whistleblowers play in service
of promoting justice and accountability, the legal protections that exist to
support employees of conscience largely fail to either encourage employees
to serve as enforcement mechanisms for existing laws or to protect them if
they suffer retaliation for raising concerns. Unlike protected classes of
citizens against whom discrimination based on inherent characteristics, such
as race, sex, national origin, or religion, is prohibited by the Civil Rights

11

DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 8, at 10; Lilanthi Ravishankar, Encouraging
Internal Whistleblowing in Organizations, SANTA CLARA UNIV. (2003),
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/whistleblowing.html
(describing
whistleblowers as “snitches” and “saviors.”).
12
Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers,
TIME
(Dec.
30,
2002),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1003998,00.html.
13
According to a 2011 study published by the Ethics Resource Center, more than one in
five employees who observe and report misconduct perceive retaliation after raising
concerns, including verbal abuse from managers and coworkers, being excluded from
decision making, physical harm, harassment online and at home, demotions, reduced
hours, and termination. See ERC RETALIATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 2, 18–23; see
also C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
POWER 18–20 (2001) (finding that most whistleblowers get fired, fail to get their jobs
back, and have difficulty finding other work in their fields, and that many lose their
houses, their families break apart, suffer from depression, or go bankrupt).
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Act,14 whistleblowers receive no such blanket protection, even though the
action prompting the discrimination directly benefits the public interest. The
legal regime that protects whistleblowers is instead a patchwork of federal,
state, and local laws with holes through which it is too easy to fall.
On the federal level alone, there are nearly sixty statutes that contain
provisions intended to protect and provide redress for whistleblowers.15
Similarly, each state offers different statutory and common law protections
for whistleblowers, with some offering robust protections and others
offering almost none at all.16 Determining whether any sort of legal
protection exists requires a complex analysis of factors including, but not
limited to, (1) the nature of the information the whistleblower wishes to or
did disclose; (2) whether the whistleblower is a public or private employee;
(3) how and to whom the disclosure was made; (4) the nature of the
retaliation suffered by the whistleblower; (5) where the employee resides;
and (6) when the employee became aware of any adverse actions taken
against him or her for blowing the whistle (statutes of limitations can range
from thirty days to three years or more depending on the applicable law).17
This patchwork of protections makes whistleblower law an amalgamation
of many legal disciplines, including employment law, constitutional law,
environmental law, national security law, administrative law, consumer law,
corporate law, financial law, tort law, and contract law: a fascinating area
for both practitioners and scholars, but a confusing and vulnerable
landscape for whistleblowers.
There is a growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship dedicated to
whistleblowing as it is increasingly recognized as a critical tool for
14

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
15
DEVINE & MASSARANI, supra note 8, at 247–50 (listing federal statutes containing
corporate whistleblower provisions).
16
MARCIA P. MICELI ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS 160–62 (2008).
17
Id. at 161.
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promoting corporate and government accountability, but one which current
legal structures, for the most part, inadequately support. Professor Terry
Dworkin, one of the leading legal scholars in the United States on the
subject of whistleblowing,18 organized an academic conference at Seattle
University School of Law on March 23–24, 2012, involving members of the
International Academic Research Network who meet regularly to
collaborate and exchange ideas on whistleblowing laws and practice.19 The
articles in this cluster come out of that conference and, taken together,
highlight some of the weaknesses in the legal framework for dealing with
whistleblowing, while also offering practical prescriptions and alternatives
for more effective ways to address the need for more robust protection of
employees who speak up about wrongdoing they witness in the workplace.
Professor Dworkin and Professor A.J. Brown, a prominent expert on
whistleblowing from Australia,20 offer an analysis and critique of US and
Australian whistleblower protection laws in their article, The Money or the
Media? Lessons from Contrasting Developments in US and Australian
Whistleblowing Laws.21 They note that the US model of whistleblower
protection has historically focused on an “anti-retaliation” model of justice,
which offers a remedy to whistleblowers who suffer reprisal for raising
concerns, but fails to create safe mechanisms to address the actual
wrongdoing through internal channels or to incentivize employee
disclosures.22 More recent legislation in the United States, specifically the
18

Experts and Speakers Faculty Profile: Terry Morehead Dworkin, IND. UNIV. NEWS
ROOM, http://newsinfo.iu.edu/sb/page/normal/64.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
19
Law School Hosts International Academic Whistleblower Conference, SEATTLE UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.law.seattleu.edu/x10920.xml.
20
See Professor A.J. Brown, GRIFFITH UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.griffith.edu.au/
criminology-law/griffith-law-school/staff/a-j-brown (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
21
Terry M. Dworkin & A.J. Brown, The Money or the Media? Lessons from Contrasting
Developments in US and Australian Whistleblowing Laws, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.
653.
22
Id.
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financial reform laws of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank), has taken a more proactive approach by offering, on the one
hand, structural reforms that facilitate internal disclosures about financial
problems (e.g., anonymous hotlines, ethics codes, whistleblower
procedures, and corporate board audit committees),23 and, on the other, a
reward model that promotes disclosure of fraud by giving whistleblowers a
percentage of the amount recovered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission upon successful prosecution of civil or criminal actions.24
According to Dworkin and Brown, Australia has, by all accounts, been
woefully unsuccessful in enacting meaningful whistleblower protection
provisions in the public sector (and even less successful in the private
sector) through either anti-retaliation or structural models of legislation;
bounty or reward models have never been introduced.25 However, recent
court decisions have recognized disclosures to the media as part of “best
practice” whistleblowing laws for public employees, noting that
whistleblowers should be entitled to protection for disclosures to the press
after reasonable efforts to deal with the issues internally, or if such avenues
would be impractical or involve significant risk of retaliation.26 Australia’s

23

These types of structural reforms were all included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 800 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
24
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
922, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010)). This “bounty”
or “reward” model is inspired by the success of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (1988), which, like the Dodd-Frank law, contains not only a reward provision that
incentivizes disclosure of fraud, but also a separate anti-retaliation provision that is
similar to the more traditional whistleblower protection laws that are embedded in
various pieces of environmental, consumer protection, public health and safety, and other
areas of legislation. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (False Claims Act anti-retaliation
provision); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision).
25
Dworkin & Brown, supra note 21.
26
Id.
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acknowledgment that promoting the integrity of public institutions is
achieved most effectively through media attention on problems and
whistleblower protection is an important reform that compensates for the
country’s lack of an equivalent to the US constitutional protection of free
speech.27
Dworkin and Brown, recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of the
legislative and judicial interpretations of protections afforded to
whistleblowers, recommend that truly effective whistleblower laws, which
would promote institutional accountability while protecting employees who
raise concerns, demand an approach that integrates anti-retaliation,
structural, reward, and media-disclosure models.28 The new Dodd-Frank
legislation attempts to integrate at least three of the four possible legislative
models that encourage and protect whistleblowers, but it is limited to
concerns relating to the financial sector.29 While fraud has enormous
implications for taxpayers and for the market stability on which so much of
the world’s financial systems depend, as we have seen in the most recent
financial crisis, there remain other areas where structural, reward, and
media-disclosure models of whistleblower laws would be equally valuable
in promoting accountability, such as food integrity, environmental
protection, and nuclear safety. One would hope that with continued
corporate wrongdoing and political corruption occurring in an increasingly
global marketplace, lawmakers will begin to introduce more comprehensive
and effective whistleblower protection mechanisms that integrate the most
successful elements described by Dworkin and Brown in order to promote
legal compliance, mitigate problems before they escalate, and create safer
conditions for employees who raise concerns in the workplace.
The patchwork of incomplete legal protections analyzed by Professors
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Dworkin and Brown all originate in rights that, for the most part, are
exercised through adjudicatory actions. In their articles, authors Angela Day
and Professor Jonathan Brock discuss how alternative dispute resolution,
rather than adjudication, may be uniquely effective in addressing both
retaliation concerns as well as the underlying concerns raised by an
employee in the context of whistleblowing. Both authors discuss the
example of the Hanford Concerns Council (the Council), a unique
alternative dispute resolution forum that resolves whistleblower disputes at
the Hanford Nuclear Site, which has a long history of employees suffering
reprisal for raising serious concerns about worker safety and environmental
risks.30
Angela Day, in her article, To Mediate or Adjudicate? An Alternative for
Resolving Whistleblower Disputes as the Hanford Nuclear Site, discusses
some of the potential outcomes associated with a disputant’s choice of
either a traditional third-party, judicialized dispute resolution system (i.e.,
adjudication) or a consensual form of dispute resolution (e.g., mediation).
She makes a strong case that consensual, non-adjudicatory resolution of
issues offers such valuable potential outcomes as, (1) greater control of the
resolution by using the parties’ local knowledge, accounting for the parties’
mutual interests, and defining appropriate solutions for the situation; (2)
lower costs for participants; (3) the development of trust through working
mutually toward resolution, boding well for improving future work
relationships and resolving disputes; (4) greater legitimacy of outcomes due
to joint settlement of issues; and (5) sustainable outcomes likely to be
implemented rather than appealed.31
30

See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org (last visited
Oct. 5, 2012). In the interest of full disclosure, I currently serve on the Hanford Concerns
Council as an employee advocate member, and can speak from direct experience to its
operations.
31
Angela Day, To Mediate or Adjudicate? An Alternative for Resolving Whistleblower
Disputes as the Hanford Nuclear Site, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 617.

WHISTLEBLOWING

Introduction: Speaking Up for Justice, Suffering Injustice 565

These five factors are particularly relevant considerations in the context
of whistleblowing disputes, which Day highlights through reference to the
Hanford Concerns Council and which Brock expands upon in his
contribution, Filling the Holes in Whistleblower Protection Systems:
Lessons from the Hanford Council Experience.32 The Council, which has
operated (in two incarnations) over a period of sixteen years, is a unique
mediation system that offers an avenue for employees of companies that
have elected to participate in the Council to seek redress for alleged reprisal
for having raised concerns related to workplace and environmental safety
and health.33 The Council is non-adversarial and its proceedings are bound
by the confidentiality rules applicable to mediations in Washington State.34
It is made up of members who serve the roles of employee advocates,
company representatives, and neutrals who, together, make a
recommendation for “full, fair and final resolution” by consensus after
engaging in significant independent assessment of the issues raised by the
employee.35 The employee may choose to accept the Council’s
recommendation or pursue other options; the member company President is
committed by the Council charter to presumptively implement the Council’s
recommendation if accepted by the employee.36 The Council has
successfully resolved 100 percent of the cases it has accepted; while some
of the cases have involved a monetary award as part of the settlement, most

32

Jonathan Brock, Filling the Holes in Whistleblower Protection Systems: Lessons from
the Hanford Council Experience, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 573.
33
Hanford Concerns Council Charter, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL § 1.1 (June 1,
2008), available at http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/council_charter.pdf.
34
Id. at § 5.6.
35
Id. § 1.1.1 (Roles and scope); §4.2 (Membership); see also 2010 Progress Report,
HANFORD
CONCERNS
COUNCIL
5–6
(2010),
available
at
http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_progressreport2010.pdf.
36
See Bringing Concerns to the Council, Typical Steps, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL,
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/bring_steps.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2012);
see also Hanford Concerns Council Charter, supra note 233, § 2.6.
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cases have included such remedies as addressing the safety concerns raised
by the employee and creating system improvements, restoring an
employee’s career path and improving workplace relationships, and
instituting training on a safe and reprisal-free work environment.37
Hanford presents an ideal environment in which a unique dispute
resolution system like the Council can succeed because of several factors:
active public interest organizations engaging in oversight at the nuclear site,
a pattern of reprisal against employees who have spoken out about serious
safety and environmental problems, adverse media coverage, protracted
litigation, congressional investigations, and its function of performing
highly regulated, urgent, and dangerous nuclear cleanup work by
government contractors.
Professor Brock identifies numerous weaknesses embedded in current
legislative options, such as those described by Professors Dworkin and
Brown, that undermine the objectives of protecting and encouraging
employees to identify serious concerns. Some of these weaknesses include
the following:


No mechanisms to address the substantive issues prompting the
whistleblower’s claim of retaliation.



Fault-finding focus of adjudication creates defensiveness and
precludes discussion to address and solve issues.



Limited to no protection for employees during processes,
exacerbating potential financial insecurity, emotional stress, and
workplace conflict.



Lack of confidentiality in processes contributes to employee
vulnerability and unwillingness of employer to engage in candid
discussions to learn from situation and reach constructive
resolutions.

37

Brock, supra note 32.
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Perception that third-party programs are biased and lack objectivity
(e.g., internal employee concerns programs perceived as
management tool by employees; government agencies perceived as
biased against employers).



Adjudicated solutions not stable because win/lose system
encourages appeals, defensiveness, and ongoing conflict.38

As Brock argues in his article, and consistent with Day’s analysis of the
beneficial factors of mediation, alternatives like the Council or other
alternative dispute resolution forums are uniquely positioned to fill the gaps
in the current legislative patchwork of whistleblower protection laws and,
more importantly, to resolve real problems with legal compliance or
potential harm posed by government and corporate institutions that are
identified by the whistleblowers. The Hanford Concerns Council process
specifically, and alternative dispute resolution options more generally, can
address these weaknesses that are endemic to adjudication and that are
exponential in the context of whistleblower disputes. For instance,
mediation can create more equal bargaining power between an employee
and an employer in order for both to contribute their knowledge of the
institution’s unique culture and challenges towards a creative solution that
can address underlying problems and promote workplace norms that
support raising concerns.39
Similarly, the costs of alternative dispute resolution are lower for both the
employee and the employer.40 For whistleblowers, many of whom suffer
termination, the costs of adjudication can be prohibitive, with cases taking
many years to ultimately resolve.41 For employers, the costs can be
significant, too, including not only expensive litigation costs but also
adverse media attention and reputational threat, government investigations,
38
39
40
41

Id.
Day, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
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costs of compliance, workplace disruption, and a chilled work environment
with low employee morale.42 Resolving a dispute more quickly and
creatively out of the public eye can be invaluable to both parties.
Trust is typically phenomenally low in whistleblower cases; often,
whistleblowers have high trust in their employers before raising a concern,
and then experience a sense of betrayal and surprise when their disclosures
are met with reprisal rather than having the issues addressed.43 The
employer, in turn, has low trust in the employee as someone willing to
expose problems that can cause embarrassment, costs, and potential
liability; this is the general motivation for retaliation.44 Mediation, unlike
adjudication, can create a forum that humanizes rather than demonizes both
the employee and employer, thus creating room to see other perspectives
and even create conditions for rehabilitating a valuable employee back into
the workplace with improved conditions for other workers and better
opportunities for the company to improve compliance.45
Both Brock and Day discuss the value a mediated resolution contributes
to legitimacy of a final resolution. For instance, if a judge orders a
whistleblower back in to the workplace after years of expensive,
acrimonious litigation, neither the employee nor the employer would expect
that reentry to be comfortable or simple. If, however, both parties come to a
mutual agreement about the terms of settlement, that resolution would have
42

Id. (citing Jonathan Brock, Full and Fair Resolution of Whistleblower Issues: The
Hanford Joint Council for Resolving Employee Concerns, A Pilot ADR Approach, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 497, 501, 525 (1999)).
43
ERC RETALIATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 2, 12–13 (2011) (reporting the surprising
conclusion that employees who feel greater support for raising concerns in a culture
purportedly committed to ethics actually suffered a greater incidence of retaliation than
other employees).
44
MICELI ET AL., supra note 16, at 111–14 (noting that predictors for retaliation include
the seriousness and type of wrongdoing upon which the employee has blown the whistle,
which can lead to embarrassment for the organization as well as “fines, negative
publicity, increased regulation, or even criminal prosecution”).
45
See Brock, supra note 32.
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legitimacy in the eyes not only of both parties, but also others in the
workplace as well as external stakeholders (including regulators and
watchdog groups) with interest in the inherently public-interest based
dispute.46
Notably, the element of confidentiality, stressed by Brock as a factor that
can contribute to successful resolution in a mediation context, can also
potentially undermine the legitimacy of a resolution. While it can indeed be
a critical motivator of employers to engage in the mediation process, as well
as offer comfort to employees who fear the stigma of being a
“whistleblower” even when they have become one, confidential
proceedings and settlements can create a degree of opaqueness to the other
stakeholders concerned about the issues who, not knowing the final terms of
a consensus-based resolution, may question whether the underlying
substantive issues and workplace conflicts have been adequately
addressed.47 Regulators, other employees and managers, and public interest
organizations, deeply invested in the concerns raised by the whistleblower
and in the expectations for how issues should be raised and addressed in the
future, are compelled to trust a resolution of issues that has inherent public
interest implications but that is reached and finalized in a black box.
Despite the value alternative dispute resolution creates by offering a more
effective means to deal with both the personnel and substantive problems at
issue in a typical whistleblower complaint, there are situations where it can
be important to adjudicate concerns in court. Publicly litigated claims can
46

See Day, supra note 31.
In fact, to address the risks posed by confidentiality and to ensure the legitimacy of a
confidentially negotiated settlement of a whistleblower claim, filed under one of the
several whistleblower statutes under Department of Labor jurisdiction, the regulations
require that all settlements must include written terms that address the alleged retaliation,
specify the relief, and address the employer’s effort to alleviate the chilling effect of
retaliation of whistleblowers on the remaining employees before they can be approved.
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL Ch. 6, § IV
(A)(3) (2003), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/DIS_0-0_9.pdf.
47
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generate valuable media attention on the compelling human interest stories
of employees who suffered reprisal for speaking up about issues that affect
the public interest. Impact litigation and media exposure can do several
important things, including send powerful messages to corporate and
government institutions about the consequences of failing to listen to
whistleblowers; educate the public, including workers and managers, about
the importance of raising concerns in the workplace free of reprisal; and
drive legislative reforms that improve gaps in whistleblower protection and
create greater accountability in areas that pose risk to the public interest.48
While there are some benefits to adjudicating disputes without the
blanket of confidentiality, two other factors identified by Day and Brock
recommend mediation over adjudication. The element of sustainability over
the long-term is particularly important in the context of a whistleblower
dispute.49 Whistleblower litigation can take years, with multiple appeals
from both sides.50 Employees are frequently motivated by a sense of
injustice and a need for vindication, and employers are often motivated by
wanting to justify their employment decisions and even to send a message
to the existing workforce about the consequences of blowing the whistle.51
48

For example, the Food Safety Modernization Act, which included new whistleblower
protection provisions as well as food safety improvements, was passed in 2011 in part
because of E.coli contamination in peanuts that killed at least nine people and sickened
hundreds. The disclosures of whistleblower Kenneth Kendrick, former assistant manager
at the at the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) plant in Texas, prompted the largest
food recall in US history and was a driver behind the new legislation. See Steve
Karnowski, New Food Safety Law Contains Little-Noticed Whistleblower Protection,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2011, 3:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/
11/food-safety-law-protects-whistleblowers_n_821989.html.
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Day, supra note 31.
50
Id. (describing Hanford whistleblower case that involved multiple appeals before and
after a jury trial, resolving eleven years after the original retaliation claim was filed);
DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 8, at 161 (explaining that the typical process for
resolving whistleblower claim through federal administrative procedures involves at least
two or three years for an initial decision, not including appeals).
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Brock, supra note 32.
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A consensus-based solution speaks to both parties’ desire for finality and
closure and creates a high level of investment in sustaining the resolution.
The aspect of a mediated resolution of whistleblower issues perhaps most
worth highlighting is the creativity the process affords for reaching a
complex, appropriate, and forward-looking resolution that can offer an
individual employment remedy, improve the workplace culture for
addressing problems raised by employees, and address the underlying
substantive concerns to mitigate and prevent noncompliance or unsafe
practices. Outside of the reward provisions of the Dodd-Frank financial
reform legislation and False Claims Act that are rooted in identifying and
combating fraud, litigation is largely limited to an anti-retaliation model
focused on an employment remedy that utterly fails to consider the
problems disclosed by the whistleblower.52 The settlements reached through
the Hanford Concerns Council process are great examples of creative
resolutions that have restored employees to meaningful work with trust in
management’s commitment to a safe, reprisal-free workplace while also
recommending structural improvements to safety processes and systems to
support future compliance with safe practices and legal requirements.53
Almost any whistleblower dispute involving serious matters of public
concern—food and drug safety, environmental issues, fraud, police
misconduct, human rights—could, through a more creative, consensusbased approach to resolution, become a powerful instrument for employee
protection, institutional accountability, and preventing harm to the public
interest.
Together, the articles in this cluster highlight the limitations of the
current legal framework in addressing the complex and unique issues
presented by whistleblowing. Dworkin and Brown offer a legislative
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MICELI ET AL., supra note 16, at 154.
Brock, supra note 32; DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 8, at 205–06.
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prescription of integrating anti-retaliation, structural, reward, and media
disclosure aspects to create whistleblower protection laws that could
achieve, through adjudication, some of the same results achieved through
mediation or models like the Hanford Concerns Council described by Day
and Brock. Aspirationally, what is needed is an über-Whistleblower
Protection Act that could supplement or replace the current legislative
patchwork; it would apply to all corporate and government employees,
integrate all of the elements recommended by Dworkin and Brown, and
include incentives or mandates for mediation efforts in dispute resolution.
Ultimately, these contributions support the conclusion that legal reform is
critically needed to offer more support to employees—employees who are
the eyes and ears that protect us from the corporate and government abuse
or neglect that occurs because corporate and government institutions are
often motivated by interests other than social justice. Corporations are, as a
matter of law, focused on maximizing profit, and government agencies are
plagued with both limited resources for enforcement and the revolving door
with the corporate world that funds our political system. Employees who
blow the whistle on wrongdoing present our best warning system for
preventing even bigger problems, but they too often suffer the worst
injustice in the course of taking ethical, courageous action. Our legal
system, and the public as a whole, owes them more.
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